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Cyber security became an issue for many civil aviation organisations because they rely on 
electronic systems for critical parts of their operations, which often have safety-critical 
functions. With increasing air traffic, today’s Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is 
beginning to hit its physical limits, particularly in terms of the number of aircraft that can be 
managed by human controllers within a given airspace. The industry has designed solutions to 
automate the routine part of ATM, which when put into place, will greatly increase the 
number of aircraft that can be managed within a given airspace, leaving the air traffic 
controller with the executive role rather than having to issue all the routine control 
instructions. However, the use of new communication methods and technologies will increase 
the role of cyber security and expose numerous vulnerabilities that do not exist in today’s 
more closed, proprietary, civil aviation systems. These cyber security vulnerabilities have the 
potential to jeopardize civil aviation safety and efficiency.[1] In this complex scenario, it is 
crucial the awareness of the interaction between security, safety and cost-effectiveness. 
Security measures must be considered not only with regard to the level of protection deemed 
appropriate, but also identifying areas of synergy and potential conflicts between safety and 
security approaches, and highlighting cost-effectiveness opportunities within certain security 
and safety strategies. Given budgetary and other constraints, integrating secure/safe and cost-
effective design objectives oftentimes would require compromise and tradeoffs.[2] Safety and 
security have different goals, which may lead to conflicts especially in the implementation of 
an air traffic control system. For example, the implementation of an authentication 
mechanism for a safety-related function may increase security since it reduces the risk of 
illegitimate access, but it may reduce safety since it increases the time needed to access this 
function. It is necessary to resolve these conflicts, not on purely intuitive decisions, but with a 
structured approach such that safety and security can be harmonised.[3]  
2 ATM SAFETY AND SECURITY  
Safety and security issues ought to be considered during the complete life cycle of an 
electronic system for ATM: from requirement specification, to design, operation, 
maintenance, and decommissioning.  
In fact, safety is concerned with ensuring systematic integrity. Therefore, measures are 
necessary to avoid and detect faults in order to minimize risk to people. Stochastic failures 
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endanger system integrity. They occur during the use phase and can only be detected, but their 
occurrence cannot be avoided. On the contrary, systematic failures jeopardize systematic 
integrity during the development and use phases. They can be avoided during the 
development phase and detected during the use phase.  
Security, on the other hand, deals with minimising risk to assets coming from threats 
and vulnerabilities. Countermeasures are threat and vulnerability avoidance, as well as threat 
control. The first one is only possible during the development phase, while threat control is 
performed during the use phase.[2] 
2.1 ATM Safety Assessment 
EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) has been developed to reflect best 
practices for safety assessment of Air Navigation Services (ANSs) and to provide guidance 
for their application. SAM describes a generic process for the safety assessment of ANSs. It 
covers the complete life cycle of the ANS system, from initial planning and system definition 
to de-commissioning. SAM is a methodology in three main steps: Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) and System Safety 
Assessment (SSA). Engineering analyses are performed in order to identify Safety 
Requirements for the system under evaluation.[6] 
 
2.2 ATM Security Assessment 
In the frame of DORATHEA (Development Of a Risk Assessment meTHodology to Enhance 
security Awareness in ATM), which is a research project co-funded by European Commission 
Directorate-General Home Affairs, in the frame of the Prevention, Preparedness and 
Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related Risks Programme, a 
Security Assessment Methodology (SecAM) for carrying out risk, threat and vulnerability 
assessments for ATM protection has been proposed. SecAM is an extension of ICAO ATM 
security guidelines and comprises three phases: Security Functional Hazard Assessment 
(SecFHA), Preliminary System Security Assessment (PSSecA) and System Security 
Assessment (SSecA). [8] 
2.3 The need for a common approach 
The way of integrating safety and security, chosen in the common approach, is to harmonise, 
not to unify, both disciplines. While unifying implies creating a new concept and 
methodology, the proposed harmonising approach intends to use standard concepts and 
methodologies from both disciplines and shows how safety and security interact.[4][5] 
Even though safety and security have the same major goal, namely, risk reduction, 
they reduce risk because of different reasons. It is very likely that safety and security 
requirements on how to reduce risk differ. It could happen that these requirements contradict 
each other and the implementation of the requirements may also be different. Consequently, a 
common approach should present also a clear conflict resolution strategy, in order to identify 
the right system requirement (from safety or security analysis) to reduce risk.  
 
3 SAFETY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT  
The proposed methodology is an extension of EUROCONTROL SAM and DORATHEA 
SecAM. It comprises three phases (see Figure 1): 
 First Phase: aims at evaluating how safe and secure the system need to be in order to 
achieve a tolerable risk. It is a process that, evaluating system functionalities, 
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identifying potential Hazards and assessing the consequence of their occurrence on the 
system, produces the system Safety and Security Objectives. Inputs are the system 
functionalities and knowledge about Hazards consequences and outputs are the Safety 
and Security Objectives of the system. 
 Second Phase: aims at evaluating if the proposed architecture is expected to achieve a 
tolerable risk. It is a process that produces system requirements related to Safety and 
Security (Safety and Security Requirements) in order to satisfy all the Safety and 
Security Objectives defined in the First Phase.  
 Third Phase: aims at demonstrating that the system as implemented achieves a 
tolerable risk, i.e. satisfies the Safety and Security Objectives identified in the First 
Phase and the system elements meet the Safety and Security Requirements specified in 
the Second Phase. 
 
 
Figure 1: Safety and Security Risk Assessment Methodology Overview 
3.1 First Phase: Identification of Safety and Security Objectives 
The First Phase of the methodology is a top-down iterative process, starting at the beginning 
of the development or modification of an Air Navigation System (ANS) that aims at 
determining how safe and secure the system needs to be. A Hazard has an impact on the 
Safety or on the Security of the system depending on the conditions and causes (faults for 
Safety and threats and attacks for Security) that could lead to an accident or incident.  
The steps to be performed during this phase are: 
 To identify all potential Hazards associated with the system; 
 To identify Hazard effects on system functionalities; 
 To assess the impact of Hazard effect(s); 
 To derive Safety and Security Objectives, i.e. to determine their acceptability in terms 
of Hazard’s maximum likelihood of occurrence, derived from the impact and the 
maximum likelihood of the Hazard’s effects. 
3.1.1 Identification of Hazards 
The identification of all potential Hazards is performed through the: 
1. Identification of all the functionalities that the system under evaluation is expected 
to provide; 
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2. Definition of a sub-set of functionalities containing only the system’s 
functionalities that are relevant from a safety and security point of view, i.e. the 
functionalities that have to be protected. 
The selection of these functionalities will take into account: 
 How critical the functionality is from a safety point of view, i.e. the loss or the 
corruption of such a functionality due to a fault would have a high impact on 
people, equipment and procedures.   
 How “attractive” is the functionality from an attacker point of view: an 
attacker could decide to attack a functionality on the basis of the effort needed 
to perform the attack in terms of costs, time needed to prepare the attack, skills 
required to achieve the attack, equipment required to be able to perform the 
attack, the likelihood of being identified during the attack.  
3. Definition of all the potential Hazards as any condition, event, or circumstance 
which could lead to the loss or the corruption of such functionalities. 
3.1.2 Identification of Hazard’s effect 
In order to classify the impact of Hazards, a classification scheme is adopted. All the possible 
consequences of the Hazard on the system are identified and the impact of these consequences 
are established. This impact is a number from 1 to 5 as reported in Table 1. 
To obtain this evaluation, the impact of the Hazard’s effect(s) must be evaluated on 
each of the Areas of Impact.[7][8]   
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Table 1: Areas of Impact 
The final impact value for each Security Hazard’s effect will be the maximum impact 
level from this evaluation. 
3.1.3 Safety and Security Objectives Identification 
The Safety and Security Objectives specify, for each identified Hazard, the maximum 
tolerable likelihood of its occurrence, given its assessed impact. In particular, it is linked to 
the tolerability of a loss or corruption of a functionality due to a fault or an attack.  
For each identified Hazard, the Risk associated to it will be evaluated as follows: 
 
 Risk = Lh * Ic (1) 
 
Where: 
 Lh indicates the likelihood of the Hazard;  
 Ic indicates the impact of the consequence on the system (people, procedures, 
equipment).  
The Risk Classification Scheme (see Table 2) is used in order to fix the maximum 
likelihood of a Hazard, given its assessed Impact, in order to achieve a tolerable risk. 
The class of likelihood is defined as follows: 
 Very Frequent: Likely to occur often; 
 Frequent: Likely to occur several times; 
 Occasional: Likely to occur sometime; 
 Rare: Unlikely but may occur exceptionally; 
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Table 2: Risk Classification Scheme  
3.2 Second Phase: Identification of Safety and Security Requirements 
The objective of the Second Phase is to evaluate if the proposed architecture is expected to 
achieve a tolerable risk. It is a top-down iterative process, conducted during the System 
Design phase of the system life cycle. It is performed for a new system or each time there is a 
change to the design of an existing system. In the second case, the purpose is to identify the 
impact of such a change on the architecture and to ensure the ability of the new architecture to 
meet either the same or new Safety/Security Objectives. The essential pre-requisite is a 
description of the high level functions of the system. This Second Phase aims at deriving the 
Safety and Security Requirements for each individual system element under evaluation 
(People, Procedure and Equipment), in order to satisfy the Safety and Security Objective of 
the system. 
The Second Phase starts with the Identification of all the Assets that provide the 
functionalities associated to the Safety and Security Objectives, identified during the First 
Phase. 
According to [9] the Assets are classified as: 
 Primary assets: they are the intangible activities, information and services that 
contribute to have the functionalities of the system to be protected (the ones 
specified in the Security Objectives). 
 Supporting assets: they are the physical entities which enable the primary assets.  
They are of various types, e.g., hardware, software, operating systems, business 
applications, networks, storage media, relays, communication interfaces, 
personnel, sites, premises, utilities, subcontractors, authorities and organisations.  
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The apportion of Safety and Security Objectives into Safety and Security 
Requirements allocated to the system elements, is performed through two analyses: 
 Fault and Attack Tree Analysis (FATA): it is a functional analysis that aims at 
identifying the logical combination of consequences coming from faults and 
attacks, leading to the non-fulfilment of the safety and security objectives. The 
focus is on the consequences on Primary Assets. The output of this analysis will be 
the list of faults and attacks that can impact on a given Safety or Security 
Objective (linked to one or more Primary Asset) with an assigned likelihood. 
 Failure Mode and Vulnerability Effects Analysis (FMVEA): it is a physical 
analysis and aims at evaluating if the Supporting Assets linked to given Safety or 
Security Objectives are vulnerable to the identified failures and threats. 
The combination of FATA and FMVEA analyses allows the identification of how 
critical are the Supporting Assets and consequently to define the Countermeasures in a cost-
effective way. The Countermeasures are traced to the System Requirements that become 
Safety and Security Requirements. 
Figure 2 shows an overview of the process. 
 
 
Figure 2: Safety and Security Requirements identification process 
3.2.1 Fault and Attack Tree Analysis (FATA) 
FATA is performed starting from the identification of credible system hazards, classified 
according to their severity of effects in the First Phase. 
A tree is developed for each Top Event (Safety and Security Objective) identified. A 
tree is a model that graphically and logically represents the various combinations of possible 
failures and events occurring in a system that lead to a failure condition at the top. 
Once the FATA is performed, starting from the likelihood assigned to the Safety or 
Security Objective, the likelihood to be assigned to each element in the diagram is determined 
by applying a top down process. In this way, it is possible to apportion the requirements 
coming from the Safety and Security Objectives to physical components functionalities, thus 
allowing a direct link of these requirements to the physical components failures that affect 
these functions, by performing a dedicated FMVEA. 
3.2.2  Failure Mode and Vulnerability Effects Analysis (FMVEA) 
FMVEA is carried out on physical components in order to identify possible failure modes, 
vulnerabilities, their effects at different levels, their connection to FATA, their severity, their 
possible countermeasures and the associated Safety and Security System Requirements. 
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The input of this analysis will be the design information of the system that allows 
establishing which Supporting Assets support the Primary Assets that provide the 
functionality associated to a given Safety and Security Objective.  
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Table 3: FMVEA 
3.2.3 Conflict resolution strategy 
Conflict resolution is needed whenever different safety and security requirements are 
identified as measures to reduce a risk, which are potentially in contrast one to the other.  
The first step to follow is to specify the conflict resolution policy. It is a set of rules 
determined by the engineer that are used to resolve conflicts. Depending on the field of 
application, the resolution policy may prefer safety or security aspects. The rules can apply 
not only to the complete system or technology but also to single entities (e.g., nodes) or even 
software parts (e.g., safety- and security-related protocol stacks).  
The second step to follow is to group the safety and security requirements into three 
groups: 
 detective: detection of faults and attacks; 
 preventive: guard against systematic faults and attacks; 
 corrective: response to a fault and attack. 
While detective safety and security requirements do not have any impact on the 
system or entities or software parts, preventive and corrective requirements do. Thus, these 
two groups of requirements are subject to investigation in the conflict resolution. 
Finally, the third step consists of the conflict resolution itself, it is performed by taking 
each conflicting preventive or corrective safety and security requirement and applying the 
conflict resolution policy (defined at step one). In the end, a conflict-free set of requirements 
is available. 
3.3 Third Phase: Verification and Validation 
Verification and Validation is the last phase of the methodology. This phase aims at 
evaluating if the implemented architecture achieves a tolerable risk. It is a top-down iterative 
process led during system integration, validation and on-site acceptance. The process 
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produces assurance that the Safety and Security Objectives are satisfied and that system 
elements meet their Safety and Security Requirements. 
The objective of the Third Phase is to collect evidences and to provide assurance that: 
 each system (people, procedure, equipment) element as implemented meets its 
Safety and Security Requirements; 
 the system as implemented satisfies its Safety and Security Objectives throughout 
its operational lifetime (till decommissioning); 
 the system satisfies users expectations with respect to Safety and Security; 
 the system achieves a tolerable risk. 
The correct implementation of Safety and Security Measures will be demonstrated 
through Verification and Validation activities. 
4 CASE STUDY APPLICATION: CONTROLLER-PILOT DATA LINK 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM   
The Air Ground Datalink (AGDL) communication system has been selected to validate the 
methodology. 
In particular the CPDLC application provides a means of communication between the 
controller and pilot, using data link for ATC communication. Then CPDLC is a mean of 
digital communication between aircraft and ATCO, allowing data exchange in digital text 
format. 
There are two types of CPDLC messages: 
 Downlink messages, which are CPDLC messages sent from aircraft; 
 Uplink messages, which are CPDLC messages sent from a ground system. 
The CPDLC application is used by the following services[10]: 
 ATC Communication Management (ACM) service provides automated 
assistance to the aircrew and current and next controllers for conducting the 
transfer of ATC communications. The ACM Service encompasses the transfer of 
all controller/aircrew communications, both the voice channel and the data 
communications channel used to accomplish the ACM Service. The ACM service 
is completed prior to using any other CPDLC service. 
 ATC Clearance (ACL) for exchanging clearances and requests between the 
current data authority ATSU and flight crew. An aircraft under the control of an 
ATSU transmits reports, makes requests and receives clearances, instructions and 
notifications. The ACL service describes the dialogue procedures to be followed to 
perform these exchanges via air/ground data communications. The service 
description states the exchanges that could be conducted via data communications, 
the rules for the combination of voice and data link communications and abnormal 
mode requirements and procedures. 
 ATC Microphone Check (AMC) for instructing pilots to check the aircraft is not 
blocking a given voice channel. The AMC service allows a controller to send an 
instruction to all CPDLC equipped aircraft in a given sector, at the same time, in 
order to instruct flight crews to verify that their voice communication equipment is 
not blocking the sector’s voice channel. This instruction will be issued only to 
those aircraft for which the controller currently has responsibility 
 Departure Clearances (DCL) for exchanging departure clearance, request and 
start up combined messages between the current ATSU and grounded aircraft to 
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prepare its departure. Where local procedures or flight category require, flights 
intending to depart from an airport must first obtain a departure clearance from the 
C-ATSU. The process can only be accomplished if the flight operator has filed a 
flight plan with the appropriate ATM authority. The DCL Service provides 
automated assistance for requesting and delivering departure information and 
clearance, with the objective of reducing aircrew and controller workload and 
diminishing clearance delivery delays. 
4.1 First Phase: Identification of Safety and Security Objectives 
An analysis of CPDLC functionalities is performed in order to identify Hazards. According to 
the classification of effects, Safety and Security Objectives are identified: 
Safety and Security Objectives Description 
SSO-1 The likelihood of out-of-sequence CPDLC message shall be less 
than Occasional 
SSO-2 The likelihood of failure to exchange CPDLC messages or denial 
of CPDLC Services shall be less than Extremely Rare 
SSO-3 The likelihood of loss of integrity or corrupted CPDLC messages 
exchange shall be less than Rare 
SSO-4 The likelihood of non-reception or theft of a CPDLC message 
shall be less than Rare 
SSO-5 The likelihood of reception of an unexpected or fake CPDLC 
message shall be less than Rare 
Table 4: CPDLC Safety and Security Objectives  
4.2 Second Phase: Identification of Safety and Security Requirements 
FATA is performed in order to analyse Primary Assets potentially affected by the identified 
Safety and Security Objectives. 
 
Figure 3: FATA example 
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Table 5: FMVEA example  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper was the definition of a new methodology for carrying out safety 
and security risk assessment in air traffic control domain, harmonising both safety and 
security through the use of standard concepts and methodologies from both disciplines and 
showing how they interact in every stage of the life cycle. Both Safety and Security 
Requirements can be identified at design phase, considering areas of synergy and potential 
conflicts, and highlighting cost-effectiveness opportunities. For demonstrative purposes, the 
methodology has been applied to the real case study of approach and landing flight phases 
scenario, with a special focus on Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications systems. 
6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND REFERENCES 
The research leading to these results is carried out with the financial support of the 
Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security 
related Risks Programme of the European Commission – Directorate-General Home Affairs 
(Registration number HOME/2010/CIPS/AG/030, DORATHEA Project). 
REFERENCES 
[1] UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), Cyber Security in Civil 
Aviation, 2012. 
[2] Richard Paradis, Bambi Tran, Balancing Security/Safety and Sustainability Objectives, 
National Institute of Building Sciences, 2010. 
[3] Thomas Novak, Andreas Gerstinger, Safety- and Security-Critical Services in Building 
Automation and Control Systems, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 57, 
no. 11, November 2010. 
[4] IEC 15408, Information Technology-Security Technique-Evaluation Criteria for IT 
Security, 2005. 
[5] IEC 61508, Functional Safety of Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-
Related Systems, 1998. 
[6] EUROCONTROL, Air Navigation System Safety Assessment Methodology, Ed. 2.1, 2006. 
[7] EUROCONTROL, EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement ESARR4 Risk 
Assessment and Mitigation in ATM, Ed. 1.0, 2001. 
[8] F. Matarese, P. Montefusco, P. Altieri, J. Neves, A. Rocha, Development of a Security 
Risk Assessment Methodology to enhance Security Awareness in ATM, Avionics Europe 
Conference & Exhibition 2013.  
[9] EUROCONTROL, Deliverable 16.02.03 – SESAR ATM Security Risk Assessment 
Method, Ed.01.01, SESAR WP16.2 ATM Security. 
[10] ICAO, Manual of Air Traffic Services Data Link Applications, First Edition, 1999. 
